Alexey Kushnir
Ph.D. student in Economics
at Pennsylvania State University
Research interests:
Primary: Microeconomic Theory,
Matching markets, Auctions
Secondary: Political Economics,
Decision Theory
Kushnir,
A. “Matching market with signals”, working paper (2008)
This paper studies one-to-one matching markets with signals under
incomplete information. An example of such an environment is a matching market
of new economic Ph.D. candidates applying to economic graduate programs for
faculty positions. Each student can send up to K identical signals to programs.
Each program can invite only one student. The paper shows that the introduction
of signals significantly improves the number of matching outcomes compared to a
non-signaling case. Besides, programs have lower expected payoffs if they
respond more often to signals in equilibria. However, students' expected
payoffs and the expected number of matches are higher when programs respond
more often to signals. The existence of equilibria and some of the comparative
statics results are extended to many-to-one matching markets.
Kushnir, A. “Signaling in matching markets with almost
aligned preferences”, working paper (2008)
(slides)
(available upon request)
This paper studies one-to-one matching markets with signals
under incomplete information. I assume an almost complete information environment.
Programs have preferences which are perfectly alligned. Students are either
"typical" with common known preferences or "atypical with
preferences which are ex ante uniformly distributed. The signals have ambiguous
inluence on the welfare of students and negative influence on the welfare of
programs in this environment. Signaling increases the welfare of
"atypical" students giving an opportunity to transmit information
about their preferences. In the same time, signaling decreases the expected
number of matches in equilibria. Besides, there are equilibria with misleading
signals: programs may make offers to students who signaled to them whereas
these students rarely accept these offers.
Publications:
Kushnir, A. “Collective action problem in revolutions” Best
Student Papers NES (2006) (available upon request).
Other research
contributions:
Zhuravskaya
E., A. Kushnir, I. Fedukin “Orphans and children deprived from parental care”
CEFIR working papers (2007) (in Russian). (available upon request).
Penn State University
(2006-2008)
TA Adv. Microeconomics
(G), Microeconomics (G), Political Economics (U),
Economics of
Corporations (U)
New Economic School
(2005-2006)
TA Auctions (G),
Theory of Economic Reforms (G), Mathematics for Economists (G)
Moscow Institute of
Physics and Technology (2004-2005)
Marek
Pycia,
Department
of Economics, Pennsylvania State University
Phone: (814) 863 - 2656
Fax: (814) 863 - 4775
E-mail: pycia@psu.edu
Personal Homepage:
http://www.econ.psu.edu/~pycia/
Mailing address:
505 Kern Building
University Park, PA 16802, USA
Home address:
425 Waupelani dr., 311
State College, PA, 16801, USA
Cell phone:
717-701-6855
Email: aik116@psu.edu
Personal website: http://www.econ.psu.edu/~aik116/Personal_webpage/Personal_webpage.htm
Last updated: July 19, 2008