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Alexey Kushnir Ph.D. student in Economics at The Research
interests: Primary:
Economic Theory, Matching markets, Auctions Secondary:
Political Economics, Decision Theory |
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Working Papers:
Can costless signaling be harmful for matching
markets? (2009)
(slides) A
costless signaling mechanism has been proposed as a device to improve welfare
in decentralized two-sided matching markets. An example of such an
environment is a job market for new Ph.D. economists. We study a market game
of incomplete information between firms and workers and show that costless
signaling is actually harmful for some matching markets. Specifically,
signaling lessens the total number of matches and affects ambiguously the
welfare of agents. As a result, we show that signals have two controversial
roles in matching markets: transmit information and facilitate information
asymmetry. Signaling
in matching markets with uniform distribution of preferences (2008),
(2009 version coming soon) This paper studies one-to-one matching markets among
students and programs with signals under incomplete information. Each student
can send up to K identical signals to programs. Each program can invite only
one student. Agents’ preferences are ex-ante uniformly distributed. We show
that the introduction of signals significantly improves the number of matches
compared to a non-signaling case in this environment. Specifically, the
expected utility of students and the expected number of matches are higher
when programs respond more often to signals. The existence of equilibria and
some of the comparative static’s results are extended to many-to-one matching
markets. Centralized matching markets with interdependent
values (with Utku Unver), 2009 Application consideration failure (with Uliana Loginova),
2009 Other
research contributions: Orphans
and children deprived from parental care (with Fedukin, Collective
action problem in revolutions Best Student Papers NES (2006) (available upon
request) |
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Teaching experience: Penn
State University (2006-2009) Lecture:
Introductory Econometrics (U) TA: Adv.
Microeconomics (G), Microeconomics (G), Political Economics (U), Economics
of Corporations (U) New
Economic School (2005-2006) TA:
Auctions (G), Theory of Economic Reforms (G), Mathematics for Economists (G) Moscow
Institute of Physics and Technology (2004-2005) TA: Stochastic Processes
(U)
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References:
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Contact information:
Mailing address: Home address: Cell phone: 717-701-6855 Personal website: Link |
Last
updated: June 25, 2009
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