![]() |
Roman ZakharenkoPhD candidate in EconomicsPrimary field: Development economics Secondary: International trade Other research interests: |
Mailing address:
608 Kern Building
University Park, PA 16802, USA
Cell phone: 814-321-8195
Email: r.zakharenko@gmail.com
US-educated Indian engineers played a major role in the establishment of the "Silicon Valley of Asia" in Bangalore. The experience of India and other countries shows that returning well-educated emigrants, despite their small numbers, can make a difference. This paper builds a model of "local" knowledge spillovers, in which migration of a small number of highly skilled individuals greatly affects country-level human capital accumulation. All economic activity occurs in pairs of individuals randomly matched to each other. Each pair produces the consumption good; the skills of the two partners are complementary. At the same time, the less skilled partner increases human capital by learning from the more skilled colleague. With poor institutions at home, highly skilled individuals leave the country seeking better opportunities abroad. On the contrary, improved institutions foster return migration of emigrants who have acquired more knowledge while abroad. These return migrants greatly amplify the positive effect of better institutions.
In the recent years, researchers have constructed large global datasets which measure the numbers of immigrants by country of birth, by education, and by country of residence. Yet, little is known about cross-country patterns of return migration: who are the returnees and how do they change while living abroad? This paper estimates how many foreign-born individuals emigrate from the United States, and how much education they acquire while in the US. The estimates are made by comparing large cross-section datasets collected at different dates. I also estimate how many of these emigrants return to their country of birth, by using data collected in their home countries.
This paper studies how skills of competitors affect a firm's decisions to innovate. I assume that the total profit of all firms is fixed (fixed "size of the pie"); firms vary in one-dimensional skill (greater skill results in bigger "piece of the pie"). They can improve their skill at some cost; I argue that incentives to improve are the highest when the firm's skill is close to competitors' skill. I also propose a model of geographic segmentation (two smaller pies instead of one) and argue that in long-run equilibrium, one geographic segment collects all the strongest firms, while another segment collects all the weakest firms.
Professor Barry Ickes, Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University
Office phone: 814-863-2652
Email: bwickes@psu.edu
Professor Edward Green, Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University
Office phone: 814-865-8493
Email: edgreen@psu.edu
Professor James Tybout, Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University
Office phone: 814-865-4259
Email: jxt32@psu.edu