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Vijay Krishna

 The following working papers can be downloaded in PDF format.  

 

Krishna, V. and J. Morgan: "Voluntary Voting: Costs and Benefits," October 2009.

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Abstract: We compare voluntary and compulsory voting in a Condorcet-type model in which voters have identical preferences but differential information. With voluntary voting, all equilibria involve sincere voting and positive participation. Thus, in contrast to situations with compulsory voting, there is no conflict between strategic and sincere behavior. When voting is costless, voluntary voting is welfare superior to compulsory voting. Even when voting is costly, participation rates are such that, in the limit, the correct candidate is elected---that is, information fully aggregates.

 
Benoit, J-P. and V. Krishna: "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," December 1998.  
 

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Abstract: We present a synthesis of the various folk theorems for repeated games using a model that accommodates both finitely and infinitely repeated games with discounting. We derive a central result for this model and show that the various folk theorems follow as a consequence. Our result encompasses theorems involving epsilon equilibria and incomplete information.  

 
Krishna, V. and M. Perry: "Efficient Mechanism Design," April 1998.
 

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 Abstract: We study Bayesian mechanism design in situations where agents' information may be multi-dimensional, concentrating on mechanisms that lead to efficient allocations. Our main result is that a generalization of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism maximizes the planner's "revenue'' among all efficient mechanisms. This result is then used to study multiple object auctions in situations where bidders have privately known "demand curves'' and extended to include situations with complementarities across objects or externalities across bidders. We also illustrate how the main result may be used to analyze the possibility of allocating both private and public goods efficiently when budget balance considerations are important. The generalized VCG mechanism, therefore, serves to unify many results in mechanism design theory.